Contemporary Continental Philosophy (當代歐陸哲學) is a philosophical school or a set of philosophical schools since 19th century which, as I interpret how Michael Rosen’s essay, “Continental Philosophy from Hegel”, characterizes it, (i) in contrast to non-contemporary continental philosophy, is more metaphilosophical (i.e. concerning more the nature and method of philosophy) and more historicist (i.e. concerning more the historical background and context from which philosophical problems and questions are generated), (ii) in contrast to contemporary non-continental (i.e. analytic) philosophy, is more pre-theoretical (i.e. concerning more on how the problems are presuppositionlessly based on how reality is present to us) and more observer-sensitive (i.e. being more sensitive about the subjective role of the philosophizing observer). The philosophical schools involved are usually (or as Wikipedia tells us) “German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism”.
I know in some sense very little about Continental philosophy, but I find it extremely interesting and myself at least capable of commenting it and contributing to my own thoughts by doing so, because I see that it is a very fruitful resource bank from which I can draw resources to complete the first draft of my reality theory. Please choose your own topic(s) of interest below to start reading.
[A Response to Markus Gabriel’s Naïve Realism; for my reference for my future research (3 December 2016)]
I can’t help but say to myself that I have a response to it and claim that even if to exist is to be in a field of sense or a context, it does not preclude a real cohesion that different fields of sense can communicate with each other in a collective, intersubjective (or human-beings-relative-objective) coherentist picture, on which (roughly, with reference to a topography in the Kantian taxonomic spirit) (1) descriptively semiotically, translation and universal language, (2) normatively, means-end relata and hypothetical universal moral grammar, and (3) sensationally aesthetically, passively withdrawing Hegelian superseding hope are based; to which (1), (2) and (3) are coextensively referring. This is reality per se best characterized as personal, as I have been arguing the whole time.
P.S. on 13 December 2016: Markus Gabriel is strictly speaking not usually categorized as a continental philosopher, but my thoughts on his ideas helped my own Continental-philosophical world-building.
[On Marilyn McCord Adams, the Theologian (4 December 2016)]
Marilyn McCord Adams, as a theologian, writes very good theological works. Her treatises are not only clear against an analytic-philosophical standard, but also wonderful according to a Continental-philosophical (i.e. world-system-building) criterion of comprehensiveness. After all, being clear is and should not be the only achieved ends of a written piece, because without also being unique, being emotionally stirring, being setting-free, being intellectually original, being sensational-aesthetically praise-worthy etc., it is but a dull piece, not sufficient to be a good one that counts to be some masterpiece of a time period. Sometimes being dull can also help achieve the end of exhibiting the meaninglessness of a certain part of a certain kind of human existence, but well sometimes they don’t.
P.S. on 13 December 2016: Marilyn McCord Adams is strictly speaking not usually categorized as a continental philosopher, but my thoughts on his ideas helped my own Continental-philosophical world-building.
[On #ContinentalPhilosophy: Post-Structuralism, Existentialism and Beyond (4 December 2016)]
I remember how I was unconsciously advancing a form-as-structure-type structuralist project to unravel the fundamental structural anatomy of the ways of human existence (aka “the elements of life”) in my last years in secondary school, but recently when I reflected on what I was doing then, I discovered the way I constructed all these can be connected to how the people at our time construct our societal lives. Put in Derrida’s thought, it is possible that the centre of the structure we discover be shifted by us as where the centre locates is arbitrary. Taking diachrony into consideration, the semiotic reality is an open system, as the biological-evolutionary reality is, in which the centre of the structural arrangement can shift over time, just as for Liah Greenfeld, the social order can transform. I would tend to response to the post-structural thinkers by saying that there is a limited foreseeable permutations for what the structure or the centre(s) in the structure could ever be, but it is of course relative to our and our current understanding of the universal. This is the best we can get about reality. My best take on the sole vehicle-like (i.e. being able to carry other properties) qualitative (meta-)property of reality is of course its being personal. I see it as the only objective and/or intersubjective structure (i) that, like other systems (or Derrida’s texts), can be deconstructed but even after deconstruction, its human-relative epistemologically premodial mode of being will still be at all times present to us as reality per se (or if not per se, at least it is “reality” as the word maximally connotes); (ii) that can determine us and determine that we, on our own rights, can have Sartrean absolute freedom, our freedom absolute relative to reality’s freedom absolute as we constitute a part-whole relation with it, which is the point I now believe Sartre misses so he concludes that there is no God of the Christian conception. Anyway, in the article
, Eduardo Kohn’s intermediate conclusion seems to point to the fact that reality (again, perhaps per se) is personal, as present to us as we are in contact even with non-living things in nature. I believe that there are good substantive reasons to advance the Continental lines of thought in this way which identifies that personhood times personality, which is our best take on universality and the rest is movable.
[On Methodology (7 December 2016)]
Continental philosophy mostly is perhaps about how one does philosophy and perhaps also other kinds of enquiries and their consequences (and in this sense qualifies as consisting of philosophical methodologies). I finally understand that it is not *only* by defining some terms clearly out of void and see whether it matches our intuition most or make the best sense relative to what we think we already know that we can be in a good epistemic relationship with reality or nature or what the world really is. Although it is useful and perhaps necessary at some point of time of enquiry, but the key is to first and foremost acknowledge that we are not to *grasp* reality in order to control or alter it (It is the dead-end of all enquiries and truth in the original and Heideggerian sense: “ἀλήθεια”/”unconcealedness”/”removing that which conceals and let reality present itself”, sometimes also present in the an institutional form), but to respect the sovereignty of reality and nature (Note: not necessarily a personal reality if it is not believed to be like that). How to respect it? No matter which discipline one is pursuing, allow nature or reality to present itself to the observers of phenomena. Try not to quickly define it; try to put aside all disciplinary propositional knowledge one possesses and perceive its presentation to us; then, use one’s language to describe it before consciously employing the terms one has learnt and invented unless it has already been wholeheartedly accepted and internalized and was not invented out of the void regardless of the sovereignty of reality or nature.
This TV series is the single most thought-provoking series I have ever watched. Some may say it is anti-Catholic to the greatest extent, but I say differently: It is an example of a blasphemy to “the Holy Spirit” which Christians must do in order to faith God the non-existent but the present and to receive and achieve salvation. The Pope is, for the very first time, a sinful human, as papal fallibility echoes how Christ can suffer and be a human. It reminds us that Christianity is as exclusive as it can be (such that religious pluralism and universal salvation cannot be our human ideal), but it is also as directly linked to universal values as we every human cherish them to the utmost. If we are not the mortally sinful but truthful saints who have genuinely internalized the good and right things we preach but are the so-called normal Christians who perhaps just say I am a Christian and sometimes help people and care about the sick and the poor, we are not going to enter the heavenly realm through the narrow gate, because there is no faith without internalization of the belief in God and its consequences. Through this I am once again renewed. A revolution to turn back to the right path begins from the death of the philosophical God. The God of the philosophers, especially the scientistic-dogmatic one, is dead in modern times, because it is an incomplete concept, at most only allowing a tiny part of God to be identified. Although that God is dead, philosophers love to throw and play with His corpse in front of the public in order to advance their own God-unrelated personal interests. Btw, (this time without the quotation marks) this can truly be a blasphemy to the Holy Spirit, leading to eternal damnation as someone may use it as a way to prove a point and reorganize society according to it. The God of the people (including philosophers), as a present personal being, with coexistent modes of being, the primordial, the expressive and the unitive, is but revolutionarily ever-present, however He is named. And in these ways, the TV series, The Young Pope, becomes one of my muses to maintain a good relationship with reality. And it is good that I am challenged once again.
[On God of the Philosophers (9 December 2016)]
If an individual can grasp completely who God is, there is no need to faith God, and this pure philosophical concept of God is thus a being inferior to us. I never know who my parents really are. I bet no one would know unless they become your friend or your object. In that case, they are not superior as parents per se anymore. Parents are just pure names then.
[On Nietzsche and Christianity, Übermensch/Superman and the Holy Spirit (9 December 2016)]
If we are to (solely) learn to be like Jesus, as Christians may say, does that mean we are to embody or internalize God’s ethics and morality such that we become Nietzschean Übermensch/Superman. I suspect the difference is that Christians may say what is internal to us is the Holy Spirit, the Other in a sense embodied by us, but I don’t see why we have to carve up reality in this way. Maybe it is because the recognition of the sovereignty of the ultimately good persona (who is a being and therefore has the three coexistent modes of being: the premodial, the expressive and the unitive) is internal to the Christian tradition such that if one groups it differently like Nietzsche did one cannot be a Christian anymore? I can see that ultimate pantheism and ultimate polytheism is untenable. (See my articles in the Notes section.) But why is the Christian way of ontological classification superior or more accurate than the Nietzchean classification? In what way persona as the focal point of understanding reality can answer my question? I suspect that there is more to the story, and I am going to find that out.
P.S. And of course, I believe I disagree with Nietzsche in that I believe if one must see that the motive of existence is will to power, then the values in slave morality, even after the revaluation of values, can still be a demonstration of power. Modern people has to be reminded that compassion is the (new) power initiated by Jesus Christ and his followers in their revolution to introduce a living morality different from (Greek) ethics.
[On “World-Bringing” (9 December 2016)]
Watching “My Dinner with Andre
” makes me feel the intensity of “world-bringing”. In our contemporary era, we always talk to each other. This is not some special and it happened in premodern times when the social structure was so stable and fixed without much social mobility so that what people chatted about was largely anticipatable. Nowadays, when we talk to one another, we are engaging in an activity I call “world-bringing”, a phenomenon type emerged in our mind during my Performing Arts exam (and so I’ve written about it). When we perform, we bring our life-stories into the stage of our life, and if expression is coextensive with performance, then our quotidian performances as our expressive presentations of our selves are the very bringing-out of our life-story. World-bringing happens when Andre talks to Wallace about his story, as he brings his world unanticipatable from Wallace’s perspective without Andre’s presentation to the dinner table and lets Andre observes, experiences and understands (or in total, relates to) it. World-bringing only happens when the other party cannot anticipate and thus in this way cannot comprehend or contemplate what a party has been or was going through. It therefore happens only in modern times when social stratification and specialization separates us such that we are not living in the same world anymore. It is a factor contributing to loneliness, anomie and nihilistic tendencies of moderners. It is a concept usable in disciplines like performance studies, communication studies, studies of modernity and relationship studies.
[On Cultural Relativism and Ethnocentrism (10 December 2016)]
What we conclude is often what the universal appears to us from our perspective and in our context. What we need to do then is not to perpetuate a doctrine of cultural relativism. Nor should we be ethnocentric or epistemo-centric and claim that we know better than others about things seen from their perspective. What we should do is to understand the limits of our context and understand the context of the other parties that we are trying to understand and their personal experience and contemplated conclusions from their perspective and so that our perspective, upon absorbing other perspectives previous other to us, can expand. A way to do this is to use the other parties’ cultural-symbolic resources to try to communicate with them our own equivalent thoughts in their terms or by the creative imagination rooted from their terms. In this way, cross-context communication is possible. Simple terms, difficult but necessary task.
Finished compiling at 15:43 on 13 December 2016. Last edited at 19:17 on 28 December 2017.