Compiled Comments on Contemporary Continental Philosophy 當代歐陸哲學:小評大集薈

FeaturedCompiled Comments on Contemporary Continental Philosophy 當代歐陸哲學:小評大集薈

Contemporary Continental Philosophy (當代歐陸哲學) is a philosophical school or a set of philosophical schools since 19th century which, as I interpret how Michael Rosen’s essay, “Continental Philosophy from Hegel”, characterizes it, (i) in contrast to non-contemporary continental philosophy, is more metaphilosophical (i.e. concerning more the nature and method of philosophy) and more historicist (i.e. concerning more the historical background and context from which philosophical problems and questions are generated), (ii) in contrast to contemporary non-continental (i.e. analytic) philosophy, is more pre-theoretical (i.e. concerning more on how the problems are presuppositionlessly based on how reality is present to us) and more observer-sensitive (i.e. being more sensitive about the subjective role of the philosophizing observer). The philosophical schools involved are usually (or as Wikipedia tells us) “German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism”.

I know in some sense very little about Continental philosophy, but I find it extremely interesting and myself at least capable of commenting it and contributing to my own thoughts by doing so, because I see that it is a very fruitful resource bank from which I can draw resources to complete the first draft of my reality theory. Please choose your own topic(s) of interest below to start reading.

[A Response to Markus Gabriel’s Naïve Realism; for my reference for my future research (3 December 2016)]

I can’t help but say to myself that I have a response to it and claim that even if to exist is to be in a field of sense or a context, it does not preclude a real cohesion that different fields of sense can communicate with each other in a collective, intersubjective (or human-beings-relative-objective) coherentist picture, on which (roughly, with reference to a topography in the Kantian taxonomic spirit) (1) descriptively semiotically, translation and universal language, (2) normatively, means-end relata and hypothetical universal moral grammar, and (3) sensationally aesthetically, passively withdrawing Hegelian superseding hope are based; to which (1), (2) and (3) are coextensively referring. This is reality per se best characterized as personal, as I have been arguing the whole time.
P.S. on 13 December 2016: Markus Gabriel is strictly speaking not usually categorized as a continental philosopher, but my thoughts on his ideas helped my own Continental-philosophical world-building.

[On Marilyn McCord Adams, the Theologian (4 December 2016)]

Marilyn McCord Adams, as a theologian, writes very good theological works. Her treatises are not only clear against an analytic-philosophical standard, but also wonderful according to a Continental-philosophical (i.e. world-system-building) criterion of comprehensiveness. After all, being clear is and should not be the only achieved ends of a written piece, because without also being unique, being emotionally stirring, being setting-free, being intellectually original, being sensational-aesthetically praise-worthy etc., it is but a dull piece, not sufficient to be a good one that counts to be some masterpiece of a time period. Sometimes being dull can also help achieve the end of exhibiting the meaninglessness of a certain part of a certain kind of human existence, but well sometimes they don’t.
P.S. on 13 December 2016: Marilyn McCord Adams is strictly speaking not usually categorized as a continental philosopher, but my thoughts on his ideas helped my own Continental-philosophical world-building.

[On #ContinentalPhilosophy: Post-Structuralism, Existentialism and Beyond (4 December 2016)]

I remember how I was unconsciously advancing a form-as-structure-type structuralist project to unravel the fundamental structural anatomy of the ways of human existence (aka “the elements of life”) in my last years in secondary school, but recently when I reflected on what I was doing then, I discovered the way I constructed all these can be connected to how the people at our time construct our societal lives. Put in Derrida’s thought, it is possible that the centre of the structure we discover be shifted by us as where the centre locates is arbitrary. Taking diachrony into consideration, the semiotic reality is an open system, as the biological-evolutionary reality is, in which the centre of the structural arrangement can shift over time, just as for Liah Greenfeld, the social order can transform. I would tend to response to the post-structural thinkers by saying that there is a limited foreseeable permutations for what the structure or the centre(s) in the structure could ever be, but it is of course relative to our and our current understanding of the universal. This is the best we can get about reality. My best take on the sole vehicle-like (i.e. being able to carry other properties) qualitative (meta-)property of reality is of course its being personal. I see it as the only objective and/or intersubjective structure (i) that, like other systems (or Derrida’s texts), can be deconstructed but even after deconstruction, its human-relative epistemologically premodial mode of being will still be at all times present to us as reality per se (or if not per se, at least it is “reality” as the word maximally connotes); (ii) that can determine us and determine that we, on our own rights, can have Sartrean absolute freedom, our freedom absolute relative to reality’s freedom absolute as we constitute a part-whole relation with it, which is the point I now believe Sartre misses so he concludes that there is no God of the Christian conception. Anyway, in the article, Eduardo Kohn’s intermediate conclusion seems to point to the fact that reality (again, perhaps per se) is personal, as present to us as we are in contact even with non-living things in nature. I believe that there are good substantive reasons to advance the Continental lines of thought in this way which identifies that personhood times personality, which is our best take on universality and the rest is movable.

[On Methodology (7 December 2016)]

Continental philosophy mostly is perhaps about how one does philosophy and perhaps also other kinds of enquiries and their consequences (and in this sense qualifies as consisting of philosophical methodologies). I finally understand that it is not *only* by defining some terms clearly out of void and see whether it matches our intuition most or make the best sense relative to what we think we already know that we can be in a good epistemic relationship with reality or nature or what the world really is. Although it is useful and perhaps necessary at some point of time of enquiry, but the key is to first and foremost acknowledge that we are not to *grasp* reality in order to control or alter it (It is the dead-end of all enquiries and truth in the original and Heideggerian sense: “ἀλήθεια”/”unconcealedness”/”removing that which conceals and let reality present itself”, sometimes also present in the an institutional form), but to respect the sovereignty of reality and nature (Note: not necessarily a personal reality if it is not believed to be like that). How to respect it? No matter which discipline one is pursuing, allow nature or reality to present itself to the observers of phenomena. Try not to quickly define it; try to put aside all disciplinary propositional knowledge one possesses and perceive its presentation to us; then, use one’s language to describe it before consciously employing the terms one has learnt and invented unless it has already been wholeheartedly accepted and internalized and was not invented out of the void regardless of the sovereignty of reality or nature.

[On The Young Pope (8 December 2016)]

This TV series is the single most thought-provoking series I have ever watched. Some may say it is anti-Catholic to the greatest extent, but I say differently: It is an example of a blasphemy to “the Holy Spirit” which Christians must do in order to faith God the non-existent but the present and to receive and achieve salvation. The Pope is, for the very first time, a sinful human, as papal fallibility echoes how Christ can suffer and be a human. It reminds us that Christianity is as exclusive as it can be (such that religious pluralism and universal salvation cannot be our human ideal), but it is also as directly linked to universal values as we every human cherish them to the utmost. If we are not the mortally sinful but truthful saints who have genuinely internalized the good and right things we preach but are the so-called normal Christians who perhaps just say I am a Christian and sometimes help people and care about the sick and the poor, we are not going to enter the heavenly realm through the narrow gate, because there is no faith without internalization of the belief in God and its consequences. Through this I am once again renewed. A revolution to turn back to the right path begins from the death of the philosophical God. The God of the philosophers, especially the scientistic-dogmatic one, is dead in modern times, because it is an incomplete concept, at most only allowing a tiny part of God to be identified. Although that God is dead, philosophers love to throw and play with His corpse in front of the public in order to advance their own God-unrelated personal interests. Btw, (this time without the quotation marks) this can truly be a blasphemy to the Holy Spirit, leading to eternal damnation as someone may use it as a way to prove a point and reorganize society according to it. The God of the people (including philosophers), as a present personal being, with coexistent modes of being, the primordial, the expressive and the unitive, is but revolutionarily ever-present, however He is named. And in these ways, the TV series, The Young Pope, becomes one of my muses to maintain a good relationship with reality. And it is good that I am challenged once again.

[On God of the Philosophers (9 December 2016)]

If an individual can grasp completely who God is, there is no need to faith God, and this pure philosophical concept of God is thus a being inferior to us. I never know who my parents really are. I bet no one would know unless they become your friend or your object. In that case, they are not superior as parents per se anymore. Parents are just pure names then.

[On Nietzsche and Christianity, Übermensch/Superman and the Holy Spirit (9 December 2016)]

If we are to (solely) learn to be like Jesus, as Christians may say, does that mean we are to embody or internalize God’s ethics and morality such that we become Nietzschean Übermensch/Superman. I suspect the difference is that Christians may say what is internal to us is the Holy Spirit, the Other in a sense embodied by us, but I don’t see why we have to carve up reality in this way. Maybe it is because the recognition of the sovereignty of the ultimately good persona (who is a being and therefore has the three coexistent modes of being: the premodial, the expressive and the unitive) is internal to the Christian tradition such that if one groups it differently like Nietzsche did one cannot be a Christian anymore? I can see that ultimate pantheism and ultimate polytheism is untenable. (See my articles in the Notes section.) But why is the Christian way of ontological classification superior or more accurate than the Nietzchean classification? In what way persona as the focal point of understanding reality can answer my question? I suspect that there is more to the story, and I am going to find that out.
P.S. And of course, I believe I disagree with Nietzsche in that I believe if one must see that the motive of existence is will to power, then the values in slave morality, even after the revaluation of values, can still be a demonstration of power. Modern people has to be reminded that compassion is the (new) power initiated by Jesus Christ and his followers in their revolution to introduce a living morality different from (Greek) ethics.

[On “World-Bringing” (9 December 2016)]

Watching “My Dinner with Andre” makes me feel the intensity of “world-bringing”. In our contemporary era, we always talk to each other. This is not some special and it happened in premodern times when the social structure was so stable and fixed without much social mobility so that what people chatted about was largely anticipatable. Nowadays, when we talk to one another, we are engaging in an activity I call “world-bringing”, a phenomenon type emerged in our mind during my Performing Arts exam (and so I’ve written about it). When we perform, we bring our life-stories into the stage of our life, and if expression is coextensive with performance, then our quotidian performances as our expressive presentations of our selves are the very bringing-out of our life-story. World-bringing happens when Andre talks to Wallace about his story, as he brings his world unanticipatable from Wallace’s perspective without Andre’s presentation to the dinner table and lets Andre observes, experiences and understands (or in total, relates to) it. World-bringing only happens when the other party cannot anticipate and thus in this way cannot comprehend or contemplate what a party has been or was going through. It therefore happens only in modern times when social stratification and specialization separates us such that we are not living in the same world anymore. It is a factor contributing to loneliness, anomie and nihilistic tendencies of moderners. It is a concept usable in disciplines like performance studies, communication studies, studies of modernity and relationship studies.

[On Cultural Relativism and Ethnocentrism (10 December 2016)]

What we conclude is often what the universal appears to us from our perspective and in our context. What we need to do then is not to perpetuate a doctrine of cultural relativism. Nor should we be ethnocentric or epistemo-centric and claim that we know better than others about things seen from their perspective. What we should do is to understand the limits of our context and understand the context of the other parties that we are trying to understand and their personal experience and contemplated conclusions from their perspective and so that our perspective, upon absorbing other perspectives previous other to us, can expand. A way to do this is to use the other parties’ cultural-symbolic resources to try to communicate with them our own equivalent thoughts in their terms or by the creative imagination rooted from their terms. In this way, cross-context communication is possible. Simple terms, difficult but necessary task.

Finished compiling at 15:43 on 13 December 2016. Last edited at 19:17 on 28 December 2017.

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On Sex, Gender and Sexuality: A Phenomenological Proposal of Typology 生理性別、文化性別、性:現象學分類概念獻議

FeaturedOn Sex, Gender and Sexuality: A Phenomenological Proposal of Typology 生理性別、文化性別、性:現象學分類概念獻議

Since the 1970s (and perhaps even earlier in the history of the West) our sexual (categorical) intuition(s) have been changing and shifting from perceiving binaries into seeing tendencies within a spectrum with binary poles, bringing about semantic transformations to the conventional simple conception of the typology of sex in terms of male and female and of gender (if any) in terms of masculine and feminine, also with a rising recognition of the intersex and the transgender in different social spheres. Whether this semantic change should be intentionally controlled or even discouraged or be let develop is out of the question here. The key is, instead, to provide a phenomenological provisional, working typology based on these newly cognitively identified experiences and phenomena primarily centred on the self and the other in their complementarity, of sex and of gender. [1] My proposal is as follows:

Although sex as a concept is as symbolic and cultural as gender the concept, sex usually indicates the individual-biological perspective of conceiving the different (and in a sense opposing) sides of complementarity, sometimes understood in terms of the self and the other, whereas gender often denotes the socio-cultural perspective of conceptualizing the self and the other in their complementarity. So, it is safe to conclude that sex is about biological complementarity of the self and the other and that gender is about their cultural complementary. That is, the male sex and the female sex describes the two biologically complementary roles where one is the self and another one is the other, with the intersex referring to the self and the other (as in the other-self) both biologically embodied by the self awaiting another other whose other-self gives an extra layer to this another other such that this another other can in its way complement the aforementioned self. And the masculine gender and the feminine gender depicts the two culturally complementary roles where one is the self and another one is the other, with the transgender or the genderqueer referring to the self and the other (as in the other-self) both culturally embodied by the self awaiting another other whose other-self gives an extra layer to this another other such that this another other can in its way complement the aforementioned self. For example, in the face of the other, if the self is more of the masculine gender, the self is masculine relative to that other. Sex the concept is but less fluid than gender the concept. When it comes to sex, body is what is anatomically observed, and its behavioural expressions include sexual activities with possible functions including procreation and sensual excitement. Gender tells a similar story, though from a social and mental perspective: Body can mean the cultural consequences of what is anatomically observed or what is perceived as the self as sensed and identified by the self itself, i.e. gender identity. As for gender (behavioural) expressions, compared to sexual expressions, they relate more to the performativity generalizable from the performances of a cultural being in their complementarity of their role of being the self with the other. In this sense, all cultural expressions seen in terms of the complementarity of the self and the other are gender expressions. Sex and gender are both given and constructed (intentionally), since sex is identifiable culturally by the individual and its social surroundings using their cultural intuitions about biological anatomy of the body which are both given (i.e. there before intentionally constructing) to the individual and its social surroundings and being intentionally shaped by the individual and its social surroundings, and so is gender too.

Both the concepts of the body and behavioural expressions are the subject matters of the analysis of the self in terms of its complementarity with the others from the biological and cultural perspectives. Regarding the subject matter of the analysis of the relation of the self to the other in complementarity, the central topic is orientation or attraction, sexual and of gender. The popular conceptions blend the two distinguishable concepts, namely sexual orientation and gender orientation, into one and use them to refer to the same referent: what kind(s) or type(s) of the other will appeal to or attract the self as the self perceive it to be. This engenders the discussion ranging from liking to loving relationships of (modern) romance, usually distinguishable from friendship, necessarily happening between the self and the other in complementarity, which has been dealt with in other articles, “On Love (of All Times) 何謂愛?” and “Is It Friendship or Romance? A Modern Ambiguity in Identifying Relationship and a Solution Based on Personhood 能成為密友,大概總帶著愛?“. Heterosexuality is the property or quality of the self being attracted to or appealed by the other of a different sex or gender (which is of a broader definition than usually conceived to be, since it includes the intersex and the transgender) (e.g. the self of the female sex being attracted to the other of the intersex in sexual complementarity, the self of the more feminine gender being attracted to the other of the transgender in gender complementarity etc.), while homosexuality is the property or quality of the self being attracted to or appealed by the other of the same sex or gender (e.g. the self of the male sex being attracted to the other of the male sex in sexual complementarity). But if gender is understood in the abovementioned way, there can only be homosexuality as a sexual orientation but not gender orientation, because no gender in complementarity can be the same. For instance, two biological males in romance must be complementary in a way that one is sometimes, if not at all times, more masculine and less feminine than the other, while the other is sometimes, if not at all times, less masculine and more feminine than the other, which means they are at one point of time at least of different, slightly differentiable, genders. Complementarity is at least necessarily there culturally. If one deems that there is and, if there is room for ought-claims, should be complementarity in biological realms, then homosexuality as defined above will not be possible unless sex for procreation (which is necessarily biological, possibly cultural by nature) is not (and should not be) the only possible sexual activity between the self and the other in complementarity. (As I see it, sex for procreation is not the only possible sexual activity, therefore homosexuality as a sexual orientation exists. But I remain agnostic about whether sex for procreation should be the only possible sexual activity, so I remain agnostic about whether homosexuality as a sexual orientation should exist.) One point to conclude here is that one can further specify orientation into the concepts of sexual and gender orientations as the biological and cultural kind(s) or type(s) of the other who will appeal to or attract the self as the self perceive it to be.

After all, one must remember that sex and gender are primarily coextensive and coreferential in precognitive semantics but only clearly and distinctly distinguishable in cognition, thus sexuality can be used to refer to both the semantic union of sex and gender and the extra-semantic, “real-world” union of the self and the other in complementarity. It is because of this why sometimes sexuality refers to sexual orientation only where the self opens towards the other in complementarity.

Here the concepts of sex, gender and sexuality are for my very first time clarified in a phenomenological framework of the self and the other, allowing issues and problems on sex, gender and sexuality arisen from typological ambiguity to be dissolved by themselves. I also believe that related sociopolitical issues can become solvable with this kind of phenomenological demystification, which one somehow finds rare in terms of its scope, its philosophical depth and its logical rigor in non-academic circle and even in academia, to admit the obvious. To conclude, sexual and gender complementarity of the self and the other is an important property of the dynamics between and within the self and the other. That is, the self is to open towards and to complement the other such that the self can be more complete than before in its biological and cultural growth and development. It is also in this manner (and only in this manner) how the self can be said to be sexed and gendered in the face of the other.

[1] One may see that there is some tension between this proposal and a Butlerian point of view which holds that there should not be any conscious attempt to construct stable, static set of typologies of sex and gender, just because the concepts once fixed cannot become drags, or free-flowing concepts. (Read Butler, J. (1991). “Imitation and gender insubordination”. In. D. Fuss (Ed.) Inside/Out: Lesbian theories, gay theories (pp. 13-31).) Nevertheless, this attempt is justified as it is not aimed to be a Platonic, fixed ideal against which all sexual and gender identities must be judged, but a semiotic schema of descriptors resourced from the lived experience of at least the West in the past decades. Such schema is definitely changeable regarding its descriptive function, as more experience different enough to generate a different kind or type of sex or gender is accumulated through the ages. So, there is no disagreement between the aim of this proposal and a Butlerian belief in the normativity of the maintenance of the drag state of the concepts of sex and gender. (This footnote is added to the article on 28 December 2017 at 16:15.)


Finished writing on 26 December 2017 at 19:12 at Tel Aviv, Israel.

Warning: one must be aware of the copyright issue and must not use the original idea in this article for non-private use (e.g. publication) unless permitted by the author and used with proper reference(s).

P.S. I also wrote an article, “On Gender and Gender Orientation Agnosticism: Why can’t we finally rely on these applicable concepts to understand who we are? 論性別及性取向不可知論:為何我們最終不能被這些可用的概念定義?“, a year ago on why I am agnostic about the concepts of gender and gender orientation in ultimately identifying the self or its personal identity and its personality. I still think that since those concepts are instrumental, similar to saying that a person is kind, for example, they are not final descriptors of personal identity, though I have been more open to the use of these instrumental concepts in daily-life scenarios.

On Gender and Gender Orientation Agnosticism: Why can’t we finally rely on these applicable concepts to understand who we are? 論性別及性取向不可知論:為何我們最終不能被這些可用的概念定義?

FeaturedOn Gender and Gender Orientation Agnosticism: Why can’t we finally rely on these applicable concepts to understand who we are? 論性別及性取向不可知論:為何我們最終不能被這些可用的概念定義?

Anthropologically speaking, human beings, as distinct from other animals, are existentially personal and thus creatively rational, hence essentially in need of a self-search of personality or personal identity. It is in this sense how they change and develop their individual personalities on the necessary basis of personhood characteristic of them, the species in general or in collective terms.

Premised on that, gender (i.e. whether they pertain more to being masculine or more to being feminine and in what ways; not the totality of cultural performances or expressions) and gender orientation (the type, instead of the token, of the gender to which they are modernly romantically attracted or with which they are modernly romantically in love) are instrumental (not final) cultural constructs (not biological nor physical givens), and even if some would like to define (or is willing to self-label so as to make sense of) their developing cultural identities or personalities or personal identities in terms of gender and gender orientation, they, whether consciously or unconsciously, are doing it for an end to understand who the persons are, that is, what personalities they have.

Gender and gender orientation are not final (but just instrumental) descriptions or expressions of personality (on the basis of personhood), because they are too generic but not contextual enough to decipher accurately who the persons are. What I mean by being final descriptions of personality is that they are used to necessarily and sufficiently identify the uniqueness of the person in question. In order to identify me but not the other persons apart from me, we have to resort to different descriptions of personality but arrange them in our speeches and in our cognitions in a way that forms an image of person in our minds corresponding to that in the bigger reality, perhaps said to be external to our minds. To do that, we as symbolic thinkers must use categories to label the person in mind so as to make sense of them. We give the greatest charity and care during the making of the image of the person in our mind, specifying the necessary and sufficient sets of properties (as I believe all properties are finally person-making properties for I believe that reality per se is personal, here properties just are coextensive with person-making properties) in a certain unique arrangement (and that’s the best the human mind can get of the image of a person), either consciously or unconsciously, distilling and contextualizing the complex of properties into the image of the person. There we arrive at the person we have in our minds. The person can have a certain gender (and thus gender orientation), but unless it is the broadest concept of gender as all cultural performance we are using, gender (and thus gender orientation) is not final in describing the person, because its being masculine, to a certain degree, if not already incorporated into and thus related to the description of who he is as a whole in general and his other person-making properties (with the holistic understanding of their interrelations and complex arrangement) in particular, is not definitive of his fully developed personal identity up till this point of time of examination. If that is true, then gender is ultimately or finally unsatisfactory in capturing the totality of one’s lived experience of one’s personal identities. Therefore, it can only help but cannot actually identify personality.

Descriptions normally thought of as describing one’s personality, like “being kind”, is under the same critique. They are not sufficient (and even not necessary) to describe a person without specifying in what ways the person’s personality are “being kind’, for example. Even if we specify its qualitative personality as “being kind in … ways”, there could be other legitimate answers, as the answers are by nature subjective, or at best intersubjective, but not sufficiently objective in that it must be so in all possible worlds or it is (metaphysically but not logically) necessarily so (in a sense that perhaps because God, the necessary posited personal being, (freely) ideates so). If that is true, then the above way to specify fully the personality of a person is only final on the human level, and only if knowledge can be drawn (or revealed) from the higher levels (e.g. the comic level and the highest, reality-per se-level etc.) can human beings conclude a more accurate picture of the reality of the person at hand under examination.

Even if that is true, arguably, gender and gender orientations are less fundamental or core to the understanding of personality than psychological traits of personality, a subclass of person-making properties of the class of personality-identifiers often studied and researched for in the field of modern psychology. It is because the former only reductively analyse the person by means of a dualistic spectrum of the colour of the person (e.g. resembling the tone-colour of music), pinpointing roughly where the person is within the confines of a spectrum or to how much degree the person pertains to an end of the two ends (i.e. in this case, masculinity and femininity) of the spectrum. The personality traits are more comprehensive in scope and so it can penetrate the person more comprehensively in a sense that it specifies not only the colour of the person but also the pace of the person, that is, the temporality embodied by the person. The temporality is also usually measured by a dualistic spectrum, this time with the two ends being clock temporality (i.e. identifiable, regularly fast pace) and glacial temporality (i.e. non-identifiable, irregularly slow pace). For instance, “being arrogant” can be interpreted as “more of masculinity” and “more of clock temporality”, as the person who is arrogant is more rough and man-like in his or her colour and more impulsive in his temporality. As the psychological traits of personality is still more useful (and pragmatically better or closer to the real picture) than the concepts of gender (and by inference, similarly, gender orientation), they are arguably better cultural symbols to be employed to identify and self-label oneself.

That is why we cannot finally rely on the concepts of gender and gender orientation (though instrumentally applicable and helpful) to understand who we are. And the position to deny that they are finally relevant and pragmatically better or closer to the real picture of the person (presumably more that merely the image of the person since the image is not just in the mind but also materialized) is being agnostic of their explanatory power in explaining the person in reality. Gender and gender orientation agnosticism is thus a good and reasonable position to be held, as shown by this article.

To respond to one of the chief claims of the current LGBT(Q+) movement, as gender and gender orientation agnosticism is defensible in the manner explored by this article, it will be provably false to say that gender and gender orientation are the final concepts to understand who we are socioculturally, unless they mean gender differently from my conception and they have good reasons to say that their proposed meaning of gender defeats my argument for or account of gender and gender orientation agnosticism. And if the LGBT(Q+) movement bases their reasoned action solely on this premise (I haven’t argued for this, but it could be), then given the truth and validity of my argument, the whole movement collapses unless it moves on to base itself on some other premise(s).

… human beings, as distinct from other animals, are existentially personal and thus creatively rational, hence essentially in need of a self-search of personality or personal identity.

Finished writing at 05:02 on 24 November 2016.

P.S. Some of my ideas in this article have developed over the course of the years, so they may not necessarily be upheld by me now. For instance, I am now more open to the possibility of the everyday use of instrumental concepts and descriptors to identity one’s gender and orientation to other gender(s). But this article, nevertheless, remains a good exposition to the conceptions of gender and gender orientation, thus one can still refer to it for my understanding of how the instrumental concepts are not definitive of personality or personal identity.

One more point to add is that since the 1970s (and perhaps even earlier in the history of the West) our sexual (categorical) intuition(s) have been changing and shifting from perceiving binaries into seeing tendencies within a spectrum with binary poles, bringing about semantic transformations to the conventional simple conception of the typology of sex in terms of male and female and of gender (if any) in terms of masculine and feminine. Whether this semantic change should be intentionally stopped is out of the question here. The key is, instead, to provide a provisional working typology based on these new experiential phenomena. My proposal can be seen in this article, “On Sex, Gender and Sexuality: A Phenomenological Proposal of Typology 生理性別、文化性別丶性:現象學分類概念獻議“.

(Postscript finished writing on 26 December 2017 at 19:12 at Tel Aviv, Israel.)

 

 

On Theories, Reality and Reality Theory 論原理、實存與實存原理

FeaturedOn Theories, Reality and Reality Theory 論原理、實存與實存原理

“We need practice! Not theories!” An activist on the TV shouted.

Hong Kong people, old or young, hate theories. Perhaps partly because they remind them of their childhood suffocated in piles of heavy schoolwork and all the restless nights cramming for exams and tests. By psychological conditioning, inevitably, they have long associated theories with impracticality and lack of pragmatic use, symbolically portrayed as stuff thrown from the ivory tower by the egotistical academia to crush their normality down the tower. Theories are off-grounded, not down-to-earth enough to capture our lived experience, they believe. It is especially the case for social-scientific theories. Unlike objective scientific (or more precisely, natural-scientific) ones, they are saturated with subjective interpretations of social phenomena, stained by our political ends called ideologies. They urge that they better be discarded, and that politicians really act to make our society a better place.

They are not entirely wrong. Theories, if are not linked to our lived experience, do no more good to us, as they can offer no more insight to how we organize our social lives, our digital lives and our biological and physical nature than merely an unactualized possibility or imagination. Social-scientific theories should not only relate directly to (or better, correspond to and cohere with) our lived experience, but it should also distinguish itself from theories from the ivory tower, which is not experience-responsive, that is, which is not formulated according to experience, or better, reasoned experience (in its broadest conception). In other words, first and foremost, theories of generalization must be first established from instances of experience, and it is according to the experiences to which theories change to accommodate, not the other way round. By then, experience can be shaped in light of the theories. There is no problem in the phenomenon that the theory in turn structures the experience back, because it is unavoidable and can even be helpful in systemizing a variety of experiences. Though we must constantly search for a better theoretical construct to make sense of newly emerged experiences to help us understand more about ourselves and the world.

Any non-descriptive, non-experience-based theories are normative ideals. If we theorize in this way, then the theories can only be relevant and legitimate only if they are (or are claimed to be) the goals for us to work on to achieve, or else, they are not at all relevant to us in any way in which we must address them. Once we realize this, we can see how goals as normative ideals are different from other descriptive theories and normative but experience-based theories. The former are by nature actuals. Formal-scientific, natural-scientific and (histo-)socio-(culturo-lingual-mental-)scientific theories of a deductive or observational, reporting nature are belonged to this categorical construct. Examples include “1+1=2”, “I see a dog”, “Water boils at 100°C” and “God heals my soul”. The latter are normative actuals as anticipated. Natural-scientific and (histo-)socio-(culturo-lingual-mental-)scientific theories of a predictive nature are belonged to this categorical consturct. Examples include “The sun will rise tomorrow” and “Donald Trump will win the 2016 US Election”, “God will not make Hong Kong a nation by tomorrow” and “Jesus Christ will come onto the Earth again soon”.

Theories aim to be isomorphic to reality on a linguistic level. Take a reality theory of a descriptive nature, of a time-relative past-to-present scope and of a (histo-)socio-(culturo-lingual-mental-)scientific level as an example. Such a reality theory aims to generalize descriptively all occurrences in reality up till the present from the past relative to there being time on a scientifically sense-making level where historical facts, social facts, cultural facts, linguistic facts and mental facts lie (I argue, in the form of nominal properties). The theory is general and global in a sense relative to all of its instantiations as specific and local, which together constitute reality from the past to the present on the socio-cultural level.

As reality per se is personal (I have argued that reality is personal in my previous article, “A Simple Defense of Personal God from Reality 為人格神辯護”) and it is absolutely free and thus is not a closed but an open system — although arguably (and well, controversially), temporally the future is fixed yet eternally it is open; if so — reality theory is possible not only as descriptive, but also as normative. Temporally speaking, if the future is fixed, then reality theory of such scope is defined to be of normative actuals, while eternally speaking, if the system (as operated by the grounding absolutely free personal being) is open, then reality theory of such scope is defined to be of normative ideals. I suspect that they are doubled, or doubly entangled, in a soul/mind-body-resembling way I explored in that previous article such that the future of the living realm is connected ultimately to eternity born by and in this sovereign personal reality per se.

Well, it’s time to stop and halt the speculation premised on my shallow understanding of the personal reality per se. But I believe that it is in so manner how reality-theoretic constructs are to use in one way by us to make sense of reality, the reality of our lived experience, not anything as foreign to us as something up the shadowy ivory tower of the academia.

Finished writing at 00:04 on 15 November 2016.